Critical Anthropomorphism, Uncritical Anthropocentrism, and Naïve Nominalism

by Gordon M. Burghardt,
University of Tennessee

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Abstract

The main title of Clive Wynne’s essay poses the question: “What are animals?” My initial thought was that the second part of the title, “Why anthropomorphism is still not a scientific approach to behavior,” should be the sole title, since a screed against anthropomorphism seems the main point of the paper. But, upon further reflection I now see that Wynne is questioning what type of animals we are, what kinds of behavior and underlying processes we share with other creatures, and how we should go about finding out about these similarities. Good questions, uncritical answers.

Burghardt, G. M. (2007). Critical Anthropomorphism, Uncritical Anthropocentrism, and Naïve Nominalism. Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 2, 136-138. Retrieved from https://comparative-cognition-and-behavior-reviews.org/ doi:10.3819/ccbr.2008.20009